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Abstract:  In  January  2020,  the  Chinese  authorities  identified  a  new  virus  of  the  Coronaviridae
family as  the  cause  of  several  cases  of  pneumonia  of  unknown  aetiology.  The  outbreak  was
initially confined  to  Wuhan  City,  but  then  spread  outside  Chinese  borders.  On  31  January  2020,
the first  case  was  declared  in  Spain.  On  11  March  2020,  The  World  Health  Organisation  (WHO)
declared  the  coronavirus  outbreak  a  pandemic.  On  16  March  2020,  there  were  139  countries
affected. In  this  situation,  the  Scientific  Societies  SEMICYUC  and  SEEIUC,  have  decided  to  draw
up this  Contingency  Plan  to  guide  the  response  of  the  intensive  care  services.  The  objectives
of this  plan  are  to  estimate  the  magnitude  of  the  problem  and  identify  the  necessary  human
and material  resources.  This  is  to  provide  the  Spanish  Intensive  Medicine  Services  with  a  tool
to programme  optimal  response  strategies.
© 2020  Sociedad  Española  de  Enfermeŕıa  Intensiva  y  Unidades  Coronarias  (SEEIUC).  Published






Plan  de  contingencia  para  los  servicios  de  medicina  intensiva  frente  a  la  pandemia
COVID-19
Resumen  En  enero  de  2020  China  identificó  un  nuevo  virus  de  la  familia  de  los  Coronaviri-
dae como  causante  de  varios  casos  de  neumonía  de  origen  desconocido.  Inicialmente  confinado
a la  ciudad  de  Wuhan,  se  extendió  posteriormente  fuera  de  las  fronteras  chinas.  En  España,
el primer  caso  se  declaró  el  31  de  enero  de  2020.  El  11  de  marzo,  la  Organización  Mundial
de la  Salud  declaró  el  brote  de  coronavirus  como  pandemia.  El  16  de  marzo  había  139  países
afectados. Ante  esta  situación,  las  Sociedades  Científicas  SEMICYUC  y  SEEIUC  han  decidido  la
elaboración  de  este  plan  de  contingencia  para  dar  respuesta  a  las  necesidades  que  conllevará
esta nueva  enfermedad.  Se  pretende  estimar  la  magnitud  del  problema  e  identificar  las  necesi-
dades asistenciales,  de  recursos  humanos  y  materiales,  de  manera  que  los  servicios  de  medicina
intensiva del  país  tengan  una  herramienta  que  les  permita  una  planificación  óptima  y  realista
con que  responder  a  la  pandemia.
© 2020  Sociedad  Española  de  Enfermeŕıa  Intensiva  y  Unidades  Coronarias  (SEEIUC).  Publicado





















On  January  7,  2020,  the  Chinese  authorities  identified  a
ew  virus  in  the  Coronaviridae  family  as  the  cause  of  an  out-
reak  of  pneumonia  in  the  city  of  Wuhan  in  Hubei  Province.
he  virus  has  subsequently  been  named  SARS-CoV-2  and  the
isease,  COVID-19.1
According  to  data  from  the  European  Centre  for  Disease
revention  and  Control  (ECDC),  from  31  December  2019  to
6  March  2020  the  disease  had  spread  to  139  countries,  and
here  were  16,741  reported  cases,  including  6507  deaths.2
In  Spain,  according  to  data  from  the  Ministry  of  Health,  on
6  March  at  13:00  there  were  9191  positive  cases,  of  which
32  were  admitted  to  intensive  care  units  (ICU).3
In  this  situation,  the  scientific  societies  SEMICYUC,  rep-
esentative  of  specialists  in  Intensive  Care  Medicine,  and
EEIUC,  representative  of  critical  care  nurses,  are  consider-
ng  the  need  to  develop  a  contingency  plan  to  respond  to  the
eeds  that  this  new  disease  will  entail,  with  the  following
bjectives:.  To  provide  health  authorities,  managers  and  clinicians
with  a  technical  document  that  addresses  all  aspects
related  to  identifying  the  care  needs  of  critically  ill




for  the  comprehensive  and  realistic  planning  of  intensive
care  services  at  national,  regional  and  hospital  level.
.  To  ensure  optimum  care  for  severely  ill  COVID-19  patients
and  other  critical  patients  with  other  diseases.
.  To  limit  the  nosocomial  spread  of  COVID-19:
•  To  protect  health  and  non-health  workers  in  all  ICUs.
•  To  prevent  hospitals  serving  as  amplifiers  of  the  dis-
ease.
•  To  protect  non-  COVID-19  patients  from  infection,  in
order  to  maintain  the  capacity  to  provide  essential
non-COVID-19  medical  care.
.  To  optimise  the  human  resources  of  intensive  care  ser-
vices.
.  The  rational,  ethical  and  organised  allocation  of  limited
healthcare  resource  to  ensure  the  greatest  good  for  the
greatest  number  of  people.
OVID-19 pandemic forecasthe  proposal  for  planning  possible  scenarios  is  based  on
luSurge  2.0  software.  It  was  developed  by  the  CDC  and









































Contingency  plan  for  the  intensive  care  services  for  the  COV
demand  for  services,  in  both  a  moderate  and  severe  pan-
demic  situation.4 The  tool  allows  changes  of  the  population
at  risk,  the  available  hospital  resources  and  assumptions
on  the  epidemiological  course  of  the  pandemic,  and  then
provides  a  rough  estimate  of  needs  in  that  context.  Thus,
it  estimates  the  number  of  hospitalisations  and  deaths,
the  number  of  people  hospitalised,  the  number  of  patients
requiring  care  in  ICU,  how  many  of  these  people  will  require
mechanical  ventilation  and  the  degree  of  saturation  of  the
services  available  to  care  for  them.
It  is  important  to  highlight  that  FluSurge  2.0  has  been
specifically  designed  to  assess  the  possible  effect  of  a  pan-
demic  caused  by  the  influenza  virus  and  has  been  validated
only  for  that  purpose.  Its  application  to  the  COVID-19  pan-
demic  should  be  approached  with  caution.
The  calculation  of  possible  scenarios  requires  several  ini-
tial  assumptions  about  the  characteristics  of  the  pandemic.
The  estimates  used  are  based  on  the  published  series  on  the
Chinese  outbreak,5,6 the  experience  in  Italy7 and  experience
with  the  influenza  virus  H1N1.8
A  mean  hospital  stay  of  11  days,  a  mean  ICU  stay  of  14
days,  a  rate  of  11%  of  hospitalised  patients  requiring  ICU
admission  and  6.5%  requiring  mechanical  ventilation  were
considered.
Considering  an  attack  rate  (proportion  of  persons  within
a  population  who  become  infected  with  a  certain  disease)
of  35%  and  a  duration  of  the  pandemic  of  12  weeks  (data
that  are  adjusted  to  the  progression  of  the  most  affected
Autonomous  Communities),  the  following  are  expected:
•  278,435  hospital  admissions  in  12  weeks.
•  Peak  demand  in  week  7.
•  The  need  for  more  than  9000  ICU  beds  at  times  of  greatest
demand.
•  The  need  for  more  than  5000  ventilators  in  the  weeks  of
greatest  demand.
The  proposed  scenario  has  been  designed  to  plan  for
needs  in  the  event  that  containment  measures  are  not  suf-
ficient.  The  following  are  recommended:
• Plan  according  to  the  actual  situation  at  any  given  time.
•  Re-evaluate  progression  in  response  to  containment  mea-
sures.
Phases of response to the pandemic
It  is  recommended  that  the  response  be  adapted  in  line  with
progression  of  the  pandemic.9,10
Phase  0.  Preparedness
•  Normal  care  activity.
• Elaboration  of  protocols  and  contingency  plan.
•  Bed  availability  study.
•  Equipment  forecast.




9  pandemic  3
hase  1.  Start  of  the  pandemic
 Cancellation  of  elective  surgery.
 Fitting  of  additional  spaces  such  as  ICU  beds.
 Completing  staff  teams.  Freeing-up  of  extra-  ICU  activity.
 Sectorised  work  teams.
hase  2.  Saturation  of  the  ICU
 Suspension  of  all  elective  activity.
 Organise  shifts.
 Sectorise  COVID-19  patients.
 Strict  admission  criteria.
hase  3.  Collapse  of  the  ICU  and  the  hospital
 Prioritise  the  care  of  patients  most  likely  to  recover.
 Nurse:  patient  ratio  based  on  availability.
 Prioritise  the  overall  benefit  to  the  individual.
eed for human and technical resources
oronavirus  committees
he  coronavirus  committees  are  working  groups  at  national,
egional  and  local  levels  (specific  to  the  hospital)  that  pre-
are  the  necessary  resources  and  the  action  plan  for  all
ossible  scenarios.
The committees  have  the  following  objectives:
 To  define  and  agree  the  contingency  plan  with  the  admin-
istration.
 To  guarantee  the  acquisition  of  material.
 Complete  the  necessary  protocols.
 Plan  spaces.
 Define  procedures  for  transfer.
 Organise  the  work  teams.
The  role  of  the  intensive  care  specialist  on  the  commit-
ees  is  essential  to:
 Prepare  pathways  and  areas  for  critical  patient  care.
 Define  hospital  and  out-of-hospital  transfer  pathways.
 Report  on  the  situation  and  the  needs  of  the  ICU.
echnical  resources
he  following  recommendations  have  been  established:
 Critical  COVID-19  patients  must  be  cared  for  in  an  ICU  by
specialists  in  intensive  care  medicine.
 Each  ICU  bay  or  station  must  be  equipped  with  a  ventilator
for  advanced  invasive  ventilation.
 There  must  be  a  transport  ventilator  for  every  10  patients.
 All  of  these  aspects  must  be  considered  when  creating
extraordinary  ICU  bays  in  other  areas  of  the  hospital.
 Cohorting  and  isolation  in  cohorts  is  recommended.
 Cohorting  should  take  precedence  over  the  concept  of
closed-door  rooms.
 If  an  ICU  has  both  open  and  closed  bays,  it  is  recom-































































 If  necessary,  extend  the  physical  space  of  the  ICU.
uman  resources
 plan  for  change  in  care  must  be  made  in  each  centre  to
nclude  burden  sharing,  care  responsibilities  and  working
ours.
The  following  staffing  of  intensive  care  doctors  is
ecommended11:
Ordinary  working  hours:
 One  intensive  care  specialist  for  every  3  patients.
 In  the  event  of  saturation,  other  non-intensive  care  physi-
cians  (including  resident  physicians)  can  be  included,
coordinated  by  an  intensive  care  specialist.
On-call  duty:
 Two  intensive  care  specialists  or  1  intensive  care  specialist
plus  1  4th/5th-year  resident  for  every  12  beds.
 In  the  event  of  saturation,  other  non-intensive  doctors
(including  resident  doctors)  coordinated  by  an  intensive
care  specialist.
The  following  nursing  staffing  is  recommended12:
 One  nurse  per  shift  for  every  2  critical  patients.
 Back-up  of  1 nurse  for  every  4--6  beds  for  support  in
moments  of  maximum  workload  (prone,  intubation,  trans-
fers,  etc.).
 One  Assistant  Nursing  Care  Technician  (TCAE)  for  every  4
beds.
 Back-up  per  shift  every  8--12  beds  for  organisation  and
cleaning  of  material,  support  and  replacement.
taff  training9
EMICYUC  will  edit  the  training  material:  computer  graphics,
osters,  etc.
Each  hospital  must  organise  training  sessions  with  at  least
he  following  content:
 Epidemiology  of  COVID-19.
 Impact  on  activity.
 Transmission.
 Diagnosis  of  COVID-19.
 Personal  protection  measures:  personal  protective  equip-
ment  (PPE),  procedures  and  isolation.
nternal  communication.  Information  transfer
e  recommend13:
 Establishing  an  information  transfer  period.
 Avoiding  close  contact  during  information  transfer.
 Special  care  in  handing  off  the  therapeutic  plan  and  antic-
ipating  changes.
 Undertaking  structured  hand-offs,  e.g.  through  SBAR  (Sta-
tus,  Background,  Assessment  and  Recommendations).
 Appropriate  completion  of  clinical  history.ommunication  and  information  to  patients  and  relatives
 In  ICUs  where  there  are  cases  of  COVID-19,  it  is  recom-
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ICU  should  be  informed  on  a  daily  basis,  as  well  as  when
there  are  no  cases,  without  providing  any  additional  infor-
mation  that  could  infringe  on  the  privacy  of  the  patient
and  his/her  family.
 It  is  recommended  that  all  family  members  of  patients
admitted  to  an  ICU  where  there  are  COVID-19  cases
receive  the  usual  daily  information  provided  by  the  team
outside  the  unit.
 COVID-19  patients  will  be  kept  in  isolation  and  accom-
paniment/visits  completely  restricted.  Only  in  situations
reviewed  on  an  individual  basis  by  the  care  team  due
to  compelling  need  (e.g.  near  death)  or  other  clinical,
ethical  and/or  humanitarian  considerations,  will  limited,
controlled,short,  supervised  visits  be  permitted  on  an
exceptional  basis,  after  training  the  family  member  how
to  put  on  and  take  off  PPE  by  helping  and  supervising
them.
 Families  are  advised  to  keep  the  accompaniment  of
patients,  whether  or  not  they  have  COVID-19,  to  a  mini-
mum.
Visits  to  patients  without  COVID-19  in  units  where  COVID-
9  patients  have  been  admitted  will  be  adapted  to  the
rchitectural  characteristics  of  the  unit.
ptimised  use  of  resources
oronaviruses  are  mainly  transmitted  by  respiratory
roplets  of  more  than  5  m  and  by  direct  contact  with  secre-
ions  from  infected  patients.  They  may  also  be  transmitted
y  aerosols  in  therapeutic  procedures  that  produce  them.
herefore,  we  recommend14--17:
 Precautions  for  the  treatment  of  all  probable  or  confirmed
patients  under  investigation  should  include  standard,
contact  and  droplet  transmission  precautions.
 Strict  hand  hygiene  should  be  observed.
 All  professionals  should  be  trained  in  the  use  of  PPE.
 Ideally,  patients  should  be  isolated  in  a  separate  room,  if
possible,  with  negative  pressure.
 Priority  should  be  given  to  cohorting  in  a  specific  area.
 Waste  generated  is  considered  class  III  waste.
 PPE  should  be  removed  inside  the  bay,  with  the  exception
of  respiratory  and  eye  protection.
 Clothing  and  dishes  do  not  require  special  treatment-
ersonal  protective  equipment
quipment  must  include14:
 Gloves  and  protective  clothing.
 Respiratory  protection.
 Eye  and  face  protection.
We  recommend  the  following  in  terms  of  respiratory  pro-
ection14,  16:
Confirmed  cases  under  investigation  should  wear  surgical
asks  if  possible.
Use  2  high  efficiency  antimicrobial  filters  (inspiratory
nd  expiratory  branches)  in  the  case  of  invasive  mechanical
entilation.18
Use  closed  suction  systems.
 IN PRESS+Model
ID-19  pandemic  5
Table  1  Major  and  minor  criteria  for  admission  to  the
intensive  care  unit  (ICU).
Major  criteria
Septic  shock  with  the  need  for  vasoactive  amines
Respiratory  failure  requiring  mechanical  ventilation
Minor  criteria
Respiratory  frequency  >30  rpm  with  conventional  oxygen
therapy
PaO2/FiO2  <250  with  conventional  oxygen  therapy
Bilateral  infiltrates
Altered  level  of  consciousness
Elevation  of  urea  (>20  mg/dl)
Leukocytopenia  (<4000  cells./ml)  and  lymphocytes
Thrombocytopenia  (<100,000/ml)
Hypothermia  (<36 ◦C)


















Contingency  plan  for  the  intensive  care  services  for  the  COV
For  non-invasive  ventilation,  the  use  of  anti-viral  filters
and  preferably  double-tube  equipment  is  recommended.
Avoid  manual  ventilation  with  a  bag  mask.  If  this  is  done,
a  high  efficiency  antimicrobial  filter  should  be  used.
Avoid  active  humidification,  aerosol  therapy  and  circuit
breakers.18
To  enter  the  room  or  a  2  m  perimeter,  if  procedures  that
generate  aerosols  are  not  going  to  be  performed,  it  is  rec-
ommended  that  the  following  are  used15:
-  Gown  (can  be  disposable  paper).
-  Mask  (surgical  or  FFP2  if  available  and  ensuring  sufficient
stock  at  all  times).
-  Gloves.
-  Anti-splash  eye  protection.
If  an  aerosol-generating  procedure  is  to  be  performed,
the  following  are  recommended16,  18:
-  FFP2  or  preferably  FFP3  mask,  if  available.
-  Tight  fitting  full  frame  eye  protection  or  full-face  shield.
-  Gloves.
-  Long-sleeved  waterproof  gown.
The  current  recommendation  is  to  use  the  mask  only
once.  Although  there  is  no  clear  evidence  on  this,  in  the
event  of  a  shortage,  the  masks  can  be  reused  by  the  same
practitioner  for  a  maximum  period  of  8  h  of  continuous  or
intermittent  activity.  There  can  be  extended  use  of  the  mask
if  it  is  not  stained  or  wet.19
Optimising  the  use  of  PPE
Rational  use  of  PPE  is  necessary  and  exposure  times  must
be  minimised.  To  this  end,  the  following  recommendations
should  be  followed:
Promote  registration,  control  and  monitoring  measures
that  do  not  require  entering  the  room.
•  Plan  tasks  and  remain  in  the  room  for  the  shortest  time
possible.
•  Group  tasks  that  require  entering  the  bay.
•  Adjust  perfusions  to  make  changes  during  one  pro-
grammed  entry  to  the  bay.
•  Deliver  care,  examinations,  etc.,  with  the  minimum  num-
ber  of  people.
• Do  not  suction  by  protocol.
•  Take  samples  together  to  prevent  unnecessary  entries.
-  Prepare  the  sample  for  sending  inside  the  bay.
-  Clean  the  external  part  of  the  tube  with  a  surface  disin-
fectant  or  wipe  impregnated  with  disinfectant.
-  Samples  will  be  transported  in  person  avoiding  transport
systems  such  as  pneumatic  tubes.The  professionals  responsible  for  the  patient  should





D-dimer  >1  g/l
ndications  for  admission  to  ICU  due  to  SARS-CoV-2
neumonia
eneral  criteria  for  admission  to  ICU
We  recommend  using  objective  criteria  for  ICU  admission
ased  on  the  recommendations  of  the  American  Thoracic
ociety  (ATS),  the  Infectious  Diseases  Society  of  America
IDSA)20 and  recent  evidence  from  analysis  of  the  SARS-CoV-
 (COVID-19)  epidemic  in  China21 (Table  1).  ICU  admission
ill  be  considered  when  there  is  1  major  criterion  or  3  or
ore  minor  criteria.
Optimisation  in  the  event  of  saturation
 In  a  situation  of  saturation  or  being  overrun,  it  is  neces-
sary  to  prioritise  the  care  of  the  cases  that  are  potentially
more  likely  to  recover.
 ICU  triage  protocols  for  pandemics  should  only  be  acti-
vated  when  ICU  resources  over  a  wide  geographic  area
are  or  will  be  overwhelmed  despite  all  reasonable  efforts
to  expand  resources  or  obtain  additional  resources.
 Guidelines  for  adjusting  therapeutic  effort  are  essential.
Inclusion/exclusion  criteria22--25
 A  triage  instrument  that  objectively  classifies  patients  is
proposed.
 The  only  measure  proposed  so  far,  although  not  validated,
is  based  on  the  use  of  SOFA.22
 After  the  first  assessment,  patients  should  be  reassessed
on  days  2  and  5,  when  they  could  be  reclassified.
The  following  are  exclusion  criteria  for  admission:
 Poor  prognosis  despite  ICU  admission.
 Need  for  resources  that  cannot  be  provided.
 Not  meeting  severity  criteria
 The  specific  recommendations  for  admission  exclusion  cri-






































































he  expansion  plan  includes  the  transformation  and  fitting
ut  of  additional  spaces  for  the  care  of  the  critical  patient
n  the  event  that  ICU  beds  have  been  overwhelmed  and
nlarging  the  team  of  staff  who  are  experts  in  critical  care.
xpansion  of  intensive  care  services
ossible  sites  for  critical  patients  must  have22,26,27:
 Medical  gases.
 Respirators  for  invasive  and  non-invasive  mechanical  ven-
tilation.
 Possibility  of  high-flow  oxygen  therapy.
 Possibility  of  advanced  monitoring.
 Possibility  of  continuous  extrarenal  purification  tech-
niques.
 Points  for  hand  hygiene.
 The  availability  of  central  monitoring  (telemetry)  would
be  desirable.
As a  guideline,  the  spaces  that  can  be  used  to  extend  ICU
eds  are28:
 Intermediate  care  units  attended  by  intensive  care  spe-
cialists:  nurse:patient  ratios  need  to  be  adjusted  to  those
of  a  conventional  ICU.
 Resuscitation  units  and  post-anaesthetic  recovery  units.
Elective  surgery  must  be  suspended.  Patients  must  be
cared  for  by  specialists  in  intensive  medicine.
 Critical  or  intermediate  care  areas  of  the  emergency  ser-
vices.
 Make  space  available  near  the  ICU  with  new  equipment.
 Transform  conventional  hospitalisation  areas,  day  hospi-
tals  or  major  outpatient  surgery  areas.
 In  the  event  of  overcrowding,  transfer  to  another  centre
with  available  space  should  be  considered.
We  recommend  that,  if  100%  saturation  of  intensive  care
ervices  is  anticipated,  centralisation  of  resources  should  be
onsidered.  To  that  end:
 Develop  an  inter-hospital  transfer  procedure.
 A  critical  patient  coordinator  should  be  designated  in  each
Autonomous  Community  to  comprehensively  manage  all
the  critical  beds  in  each  Community.
xpansion  of  staff
e  recommend29,30:
Conducting  a  census  of  all  medical  personnel  who  spe-
ialise  in  intensive  care  medicine,  to  also  include:
 Physicians  with  on-call  contracts.
 Intensive  care  specialists  dedicated  to  other  tasks  in  the
hospital.
 Unemployed  doctors.
 Recent  retirees. Conduct  a  census  of  other  staff  physicians  or  residents
who  may  have  the  capacity  to  care  for  less  serious
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 Extending  substitution  contracts.
 Carry  out  a  plan  for  medical  staffing  and  burden  sharing
in  all  hospitals.
 Conduct  a  census  of  nursing  staff  with  knowledge  and
experience  in  critical  patient  care.
 Develop  a  plan  to  relocate  experienced  nurses  to  critical
areas
 Consider  the  peak  care  load  in  forecasts.
 If  medical  or  nursing  staff  who  are  not  undertaking  their
usual  work  are  included  in  critical  care  activities,  they
should  first  receive  training.
 Training  should  include  2  key  areas:  intensive  care
medicine  or  nursing  and  infection  control.
ransfers
nter-hospital  transfer
 Necessary  personnel:  attending  physician,  attending
nurse  and  emergency  health  technician.
 Appropriate  PPE  for  the  staff  in  the  care  cabin  is  recom-
mended  for  situations  where  there  is  aerosol  risk.
Consider  the  following  during  transfer:
 The  driver  must  be  isolated  from  the  patient’s  compart-
ment.
 Family  members  must  not  travel  in  the  transport  vehicle.
 Limit  the  number  of  care  providers  in  the  care  cabin.
ntra-hospital  transfer
 A  protocol  for  the  transfer  pathway  must  be  established:
itinerary,  elevator,  number  of  participants,  PPE.
 Steps  for  transfer:
.  Inform  the  receiving  department  of  the  start  of  the  trans-
fer.
.  Prepare  the  material.
.  Place  PPE.
.  Inform  the  receiving  department  of  the  start  of  the  trans-
fer.
.  Block  the  lift  for  transfer  and  disinfection.
.  Security  personnel  with  a  surgical  mask  will  precede  the
team  to  clear  the  area.
.  Disinfection  of  trafficked  areas.
.  Return.
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